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Abstract: The European Association of Law and Economics grants a biennial
Lifetime Achievement Award and Honorary Membership to a scholar “for his or
her significant contributions to the field of Law and Economics, in particular to
the development of this scientific movement in Europe.” This paper is the award
lecture delivered by Professor Francesco Parisi at the Annual Meeting of the
European Association of Law and Economics, held at Tel-Aviv University on
September, 19, 2019.
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This “paper” inaugurates a new tradition for the European Association of Law
and Economics. Starting in the year 2018, the European Association of Law and
Economics (hereinafter, I will refer to it as EALE) will grant a biennial Lifetime
Achievement Award and Honorary Membership to the Association to a scholar
recommended by a nomination committee and awarded by the EALE
Management Board “for his or her significant contributions to the field of Law
and Economics, in particular to the development of this scientific movement in
Europe.” The EALE Award will be announced on even-numbered years, and the
recipient of the award will deliver the EALE Award Lecture the following year.
The Lifetime Achievement Award lecture is published in the Review of Law and
Economics, the EALE’s official journal. This year, it is my great honor and
challenge to inaugurate this wonderful tradition. It is a tradition that overtime
will leave tangible traces of the evolution of law and economics, and of the
fragile, human contributions that each of us, passing scholars, have brought to
this field of study. The task of conceiving this inaugural lecture was made
particularly challenging by the instructions and guidelines given to me by the
President of the EALE, Professor Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, whom I should congratulate for his recent appointment to Columbia University, Law School.
Professor Dari-Mattiacci asked me not to present an academic paper, but to do
something different and fun, “a-la-Parisi” he said. Dinner speeches consisting of
*Corresponding author: Francesco Parisi, University of Minnesota Law School, Minneapolis, MN
55455, USA, E-mail: parisi@umn.edu

2

F. Parisi

a paper, after a full day of presentations, can be too intense, he said, and he
instructed me to say something entertaining, with highlights from my academic
life. But then he added that my remarks would be published in the Review of
Law and Economics – for which I serve as Editor-in-Chief. So, I was given the
formidable task to say something fun and at the same publishable in a reputable
law and economics journal. It seemed an empty core.
This long preamble is my way to tell you that I do not have a paper for you.
To aggravate matters, Avraham Tabbach wanted to announce a title for my
presentation, and since these remarks would eventually have to be published, I
came up with the title “Law and Economics as We Grow Younger.” It was a title
that made no sense, but hopefully it would attract the attention of curious readers
and increase the number of downloads on SSRN. Also, I was informed that the
only financial value of the EALE Lifetime Achievement Award is the Honorary
Membership to the European Association of Law and Economics. Recipients of the
award get a free membership to the association and a waiver of the registration
fees when they come to the Annual Conferences. Hence, the value of the Honorary
Membership increases with time, which offers an excellent incentive for the
recipients to grow younger and increase their life expectancy. As I was writing
my remarks, many other reasons for the title came to mind. I will mention them
along the way.
On a personal note, I am particularly fortunate to receive this Award in
Israel. My grand-grandmother’s maiden name was Espinosa. I am the last in the
maternal line sharing that lineage, and to be potentially entitled to an Israeli
passport. I have enjoyed every visit to Israel, and I have enjoyed a great working
partnership with Ariel Porat, whom I should congratulate for his recent appointment to President of Tel-Aviv University. The city of Tel-Aviv is growing beautifully. At one of the earliest conferences we had in Haifa, the Mayors of Jerusalem
and Haifa were present, and they resolved a long-standing dispute with an
ingenious resolution that I’ll always remember: they agreed that Jerusalem
was the most beautiful city in the world and Haifa was the most beautiful city
in Israel. I would not be surprised to hear the Mayor of Tel-Aviv joining the
debate today and coming up with a yet another memorable line to put his
beautiful city on the co-winner’s podium.

1 How it all started – Fortunate accidents
I wish I had a better story about how I began my work in law and economics. I
wish I could tell you that my career has been the culmination of a lifelong
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vocation to this discipline. The true story is much less fantastic. I am where I am
thanks to a series of fortunate accidents. After all, the lives of some of us are
probably the result of parental accidents. In retrospect, we should say, fortunate
accidents. The following remarks are dedicated to the many people involved in
the accidents that brought me to law and economics and allowed me to grow
and be happy in my work and career. Three of them, I am particularly humbled,
are past winners of the EALE Award: Guido Calabresi, who received the award in
2004, Pietro Trimarchi in 2005, and Robert Cooter in 2011.

1.1 Late for class
As for many things in life, my encounter with law and economics happened by
pure happenstance. I was completing my J.S.D. degree at U.C. Berkeley. At the
time, my field of study and dissertation was in comparative law and legal
history. My dissertation was on the evolution of the notion of negligence.
Specifically, I was studying how, throughout legal history, the average/reasonable man standard had been applied when tortfeasors were non-average individuals, such as low-skilled or high-skilled individuals.1 It was my last year in
the J.S.D. program, and I had just returned from Italy. I spent a few extra days in
Italy because my grandmother had fallen and broken her hip. I was registered to
take a seminar on Jurisprudence (i. e. legal philosophy), and had missed the first
class. Plus, as a good Italian, I was running 15 minutes late for class. The
culminating factor that day: I entered the classroom and realized I was in the
wrong class. There had been a change in room assignment. I felt too embarrassed to leave in middle of the class and decided to sit quietly in the class for
the remainder of the hour.
With a little embarrassment I asked a neighboring student the title of the
course. The class was co-taught by Daniel Rubinfeld and Steve Sugarman, and it
was called “Tort Theory and Policy.” The seminar was somewhat related to my
field of research but proceeded very differently from the other law school
courses I had been exposed to. On the blackboard the instructor was writing
algebraic equations, which made me think it was a class for a different department. I had never seen mathematics used to understand the functioning and
effect of legal rules. I always loved mathematics. My mom was a math teacher.
My dad was a judge on the Italian Supreme Court. That class was bringing
together my two intellectual heritages. After learning a bit more about that
course, I asked my faculty advisor, James Gordley, for permission to withdraw
1 Portions of my dissertation were subsequently published as Parisi (1991, 1992, 1994).
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from the Jurisprudence class and to add the tort theory seminar in its place. My
advisor, somewhat reluctantly, approved the substitution.
That was my first encounter with law and economics. Definitely not a
planned professional choice. The mere accident of walking 15 minutes late into
the wrong classroom, led to an enchantment with the methodology of law and
economics. My advisor encouraged me to introduce myself to Robert Cooter,
who was regarded as the central figure of the law and economics program at UC
Berkeley, and so I did. My J.S.D. degree was about to be completed, and my
Fulbright fellowship was about to end. Yet, I realized the exposure I had to law
and economics during that first seminar had irreversibly changed my way of
looking at legal problems. It would have been very hard for me to go back to the
traditional dogmatic or case-driven method of legal analysis. Still, I realized I
lacked the formal skills needed to be an active academic player in that field. A
crossroad was ahead of me. Robert Cooter asked me if I was willing to make a
substantial investment in the field of law and economics, pursuing a Ph.D.
degree in Economics, at U.C. Berkeley or elsewhere.
By that time, I had secured a position as Assistant Professor of Private Law
at the University of Rome “La Sapienza”, in the Department of Political Science.
Academic positions in Italy were hard to come by, especially for somebody at my
young age. I went back to Rome to start my new job. In Rome, I discussed my
vocational crisis with some senior scholars in my field, whose advice I greatly
respected, Pietro Rescigno, Paolo Vitucci and Natalino Irti, and with my loving
and wise parents. My father understood my dilemma very well. As a young man,
he wanted to be an engineer. And even though he had a wonderful career as a
judge, he always wondered how his life would be different if he followed his
other professional vocation. Three days later, I asked the University of Rome to
be placed on unpaid leave, and later entirely resigned my position and returned
to U.C. Berkeley.2 That same year, Herma Hill Kay, Dean at U.C. Berkeley law
school, was on academic leave because she had been elected President of the
American Association of Law Schools. The law school offered me a position as
Lecturer in Law, to teach a course in Private International Law, which replaced
the Conflict of Laws course taught by Dean Kay. This allowed me to extend my
2 During those conversations, I became aware that, under Italian academic standards, my
decision to pursue a degree abroad in a different discipline would likely delay or put an end
to my Italian academic career in Italian private law. My subsequent academic career escaped
that prediction. Thanks to an invitation to teach law and economics at Bocconi University in
1999 and to a fortunate encounter and intellectual connection with Professor Pietro Trimarchi,
in 2001 I was offered a position as Distinguished Professor of Private Law (Professore per Chiara
Fama) at the University of Milan, where I taught until 2006, before joining the University of
Bologna as Professor of Public Economics.
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stay in the U.S. and to pursue a Ph.D. in Economics. My never-ending career as
professor-turned-back-student began at that point. What followed from there is
part of my academic history.
My gratitude goes to Daniel Rubinfeld for explaining the Shavell (1980)
model of tort law, for writing those (at the time, unintelligible) equations I
observed after walking into the wrong classroom, and for later serving as one
of my two field advisors during my economics graduate work at U.C. Berkeley; to
Robert Cooter for taking my fascination for law and economics seriously enough,
for recommending me for admission to a Ph.D. in Economics, and for guiding
me through the early steps of my research and career; to Oliver Williamson, for
serving as my second field advisors during my graduate work at U.C. Berkeley;
and to the many other teachers and fellow students, who helped me navigate
through the thickets of the discipline.

1.2 The Ringberg conference
Several other important things in my career happened accidentally. Another
memorable accident worth mentioning, which brought me closer to the
European law and economics community, occurred when I was invited to a
Max Planck conference at the Ringberg Castle in southern Germany. I was
invited as a discussant for a paper on the transition from floor trading to screen
trading in the stock market. I said that was an accidental event, but I did not
realize it was accidental until later. At the time I only realized I was being
invited to a conference on a topic I knew little about. In 1985, I had written my
Italian Doctor of Law thesis on the formation of contract via computer (which
was later published as book: Parisi, 1987). Besides that early work, I had no
expertise on the stock market – I never worked in finance, and I did not know
how screen trading in the stock market worked. But the invitation was too
wonderful to decline: travel to a beautiful destination, conference with distinguished participants, and the publication of my comment in an academic
journal. So, I tried to educate myself on the topic, came up with something
sensible to say, and showed up at the conference.3 While I was presenting my
comment at the conference, somebody from the audience asked me a pointed
question. The question started as follows: “Professor Parisi, what you are saying
is very interesting, but in some way, it contradicts what you wrote a couple of
years ago on this topic …”. In fact, I had never written anything on the topic, so
3 The Comment was later published in the Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics
(Parisi, 2002c).
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an evasive answer was unavoidable: “Thank you for your comment. Maybe you
can tell me more about this during the coffee break. … ” At that point, I realized
something was wrong. I avoided meeting the person from the audience during
the coffee break. A few months later, I realized what had happened. Another
scholar with my same name, Franco Parisi, from Chile, was a Finance professor
with expertise in the stock market, who often visited Georgetown University. I
have come to believe that they had invited me by mistake. But, I guarantee, I
was not aware of it until after the fact – there was no identity theft on my part. It
was, indeed, a fortunate accident since it allowed me to meet many interesting
European scholars with whom I have remained in touch and built wonderful
friendships, including Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer.

1.3 Wurzburg beer fest
Another accidental encounter happened at the University of Wurzburg in
Germany. The Department of Economics invited me for a faculty workshop
presentation. I remember arriving there for the workshop, but the university
was closed on that day, due to some sort of festivity and a beer festival in town.
The professor, who had invited me, left a message at the hotel, making different
plans for the day, but I did not get the message until later. A younger faculty
member, Norbert Schulz, later reached me and graciously offered to spend the
evening with me and to show me some of the traditional breweries. The academic visit turned into a surprisingly fun beer tasting adventure. I had never met
Professor Norbert Schulz before. He asked me what topics I was currently
working on. At the time I was interested in applications of the concept of
anticommons, and how antitrust doctrines should be reevaluated for industries
that produce complementary goods (i. e. when firms compete for the sale of
complements, instead of substitutes). My theory was that most instruments of
competition policy seemed to have been designed for the case of substitutable
goods, but when applied to markets involving complementarities some of them
could reach counterproductive effects. These ideas seemed purely theoretical
but eventually became extremely important in competition law in conjunction
with the Microsoft case. Modern intellectual property and patent law creates a
lot of property fragmentation and complementarities in the production process
(e. g. imagine how many inputs of production are needed to produce a computer, and how many complementary applications are needed to make good use
of it). Judge Jackson’s order to breakdown Microsoft in two companies, one
producing the operating system (Windows) and the other producing applications
(MS Office) seemed to overlook the complementarity relationship between OS

Law and Economics as We Grow Younger

7

and MS Office applications. Creating “competition” in the supply of them would
have led to prices that exceeded those of the integrated Microsoft monopoly.
Norbert Schulz was a professor of industrial economics (now he is a chaired
professor of industrial economics in Wurzburg), but he had not specifically
thought about those topics before. We had many beers that night. And I told
him about many other paper ideas.
During those years, I was teaching at George Mason University and had the
privilege to be in contact with outstanding students who later became outstanding professors. Professor Gerrit De Geest (at the time, Professor at the
University of Ghent in Belgium, now Professor at Washington University) had
sent an outstanding student from Ghent to spend some time in the US to finish
his dissertation. His name was Ben Depoorter. I invited Ben to live at my house
during his stay at George Mason, and so he did. Another student of mine
during those years was Jonathan Klick. Jonathan Klick was a Ph.D. economist
who had been granted a Levy Fellowship to complete a J.D. degree at George
Mason. Ben Depoorter and Jonathan Klick are now distinguished scholars and
professors, at U.C. Hastings and University of Pennsylvania, respectively. With
Ben and Jonathan, we were often talking about our research ideas, and we
were exploring the possibility of writing something together. Those were very
good years at George Mason University, with two Nobel laureates in economics, James Buchanan and Vernon Smith, along with Gordon Tullock, Charles
Rowley and many other giants of our discipline to interact with on a daily
basis.
One day, I received an email from Norbert Schulz, the professor of
Industrial economics in Wurzburg. He sent me a stylized model that he wrote
to study one of the problems I had mentioned to him during the beer fest. A
simple, beautifully crafted model. The actual paper was still to be written, but
the ideas I had presented to him were still very clear in my mind. Within
weeks, Ben Depoorter and I wrote that paper, incorporating his model, and
sent it back to him for review. The paper was published that same year with
only minor requests for changes (Schulz et al., 2002). In a matter of months,
another model from Norbert Schulz arrived in my email box, addressing
another problem I had mentioned during the beer fest. In two months, he
sent me several interesting extensions of the anticommons model. Ben
Depoorter, Jonathan Klick and I, teamed up with Norbert Schulz, and completed three more papers which were sent out for publication (Parisi et al.,
2004, 2005, 2006). Communications with Norbert Schulz faded at that point.
He had been appointed Department Chair, and his attention was taken away by
other administrative matters. After a few years, he told me how pleased he was
that our four papers had been published – if I remember correctly, he told me

8

F. Parisi

that he was not even aware of the publication of the last two papers until he
saw them cited somewhere! An accidental encounter and a canceled faculty
workshop led to a beer fest, and that evolved into a wonderful collaboration, a
friendship with Ben Depoorter and Jonathan Klick, and later into other related
research with Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Emanuela Carbonara and Matteo Alvisi
(Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi, 2007; Alvisi et al., 2011).

2 Rejuvenating encounters
The law and economics scholarship I had been exposed to during the formative
years of my study could probably be referred to as “theory of incentives.”
Remedies and other legal instruments were designed to “align” private and
social incentives. Through incentive alignment, individuals were made to
behave the way society wanted them to behave. As an example, automobile
drivers yield at crossing pedestrians because of the incentives created by tort
rules – as an outside observer, it is impossible to distinguish the behavior of a
benevolent driver who cares for the well-being of pedestrians from the behavior
of a selfish driver who takes precautions to avoid liability. When incentives are
aligned, selfish drivers will behave like benevolent drivers.
In all those models, the ideal behavior that the legal system aims to promote
is derived from a social objective function. The ideal behavior is the behavior
that will best pursue that social objective, maximizing the well-being of society
(what economists refer to as “social welfare”). When teaching law and economics, only some minimal discussion is carried out on how to formulate the social
objective function. What “Maximand” to be used (e. g. wealth, utility, capability,
etc.)? And which technique to use to aggregate individual values into social
values (e. g. Benthamite, Rawlsian, Paretian, Nash techniques of aggregation).4
Even more opaque is the discussion of which “other” social values, if any,
should be included in the social welfare function.
In most law and economics courses, these questions were briefly touched
upon during the first week of class, as part of the methodology or the critiques to
law and economics. We were ultimately being trained to be legal engineers to
construct optimal legal instruments.

4 For those who are interested in a brief survey of these concepts and techniques, see Parisi
(2013) and Klick and Parisi (2005b).
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2.1 The Calabresi challenge
As a law and economics scholar with Italian origins, meeting Guido Calabresi
was necessary and inevitable. The work of Guido Calabresi that I had been
exposed to during my studies was the Calabresi (1970) on the Cost of
Accidents, and the Calabresi and Melamed (1972) on the so-called Normative
Coase Theorem. Those were central pillars and ultimately mainstream contributions to the law and economics literature on torts and remedies. When I met
Calabresi in the early 1990s, I discovered quite a different person from what I
had expected. The Calabresi I met was questioning some of the core premises of
the mainstream law and economics scholarship. I would describe the first meetings I had with Calabresi as a challenging and rejuvenating encounter. His
lecture focused on the fact that humans care about fairness and are averse to
inequality, and he challenged the fact that law and economics scholars continued to use social welfare functions that were blind to fairness. When we met in
person, he asked me, why do you think everybody keeps doing this in the
discipline? I responded, as a good student would do, invoking what later
became known as Kaplow and Shavell’s two-step optimization: there are many
reasons why it is not desirable to use private law instruments to redistribute
wealth and to pursue distributive justice (Kaplow and Shavell, 1994). But at that
point I realized, Calabresi was not ignoring those arguments when asking the
question; he was asking something deeper. Calabresi was concerned that the
formulation of the social objective overlooked what humans desire. We need to
include justice and fairness in the objective function, because we, as humans,
care for those values, and are willing to trade wealth for those values. Kaplow
and Shavell’s argument applies to the choice of instrument (how to best pursue
the fairness objective) but should not undermine the choice of the objective.
Most law and economics scholars have taken out fairness from the social
objective function altogether. Fairness no longer appears in the analysis, not
even as an aspirational goal.

2.2 Calabresi again
The subsequent encounters with Guido Calabresi (most frequently at conferences in Italian universities, or during his visits to Siena and Bologna) always
brought new challenging perspectives into my way of thinking. In 1996,
Calabresi was the keynote speaker at the 6th Annual Meeting of the American
Law and Economics Association in Chicago. He recalled that during the early
years of his career, he advanced the idea of using tort law to spread the loss
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between a faultless tortfeasor and an innocent victim (Calabresi, 1965). This
approach was similar to what legal systems already do under a comparative
negligence rule, when tortfeasors and victims are both negligent. Thirty years
later, Calabresi, now sitting as a federal judge, was surprised that his idea of
spreading the loss between non-negligent parties had not been taken seriously
by academics and courts: “Where neither side is at fault, we still remain subject
to all-or-nothing rules. In the absence of defendant fault, innocent plaintiffs bear
the whole loss in most areas, while in so-called non-fault liability areas, defendants bear the entire loss where neither party is at fault.” (Calabresi and Cooper,
1996:877)
Calabresi saw a lot of potential in his loss-spreading rule, including that of
promoting a fair allocation of the loss between parties that contributed to the
creation of a loss, when neither of them was at fault. But, since fairness and
distributive justice were not part of the criteria for evaluating alternative legal
rules, for more than thirty years, mainstream law and economics remained fairly
deaf to Calabresi’s call. Interestingly, during his presentation in Chicago,
Calabresi remembered presenting his 1965 paper idea at the Max Planck
Institute of Comparative Law. As a young scholar, his innovative ideas were
not given the attention they deserved by the senior Max Planck audience.
Ironically, if Calabresi had mentioned the historical antecedent of his proposed
rule at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Law, his ideas might have been
taken much more seriously. Hugo Grotius in 1625 had proposed a similar rule in
his De Iure Belli ac Pacis. Grotius’ (1625) rule was adopted in maritime law for
ship collisions (sharing of the loss when the collision was not due to the fault of
either ships) and in public international law (spreading losses equitably when
faultless sovereign states were involved in an international accident). However,
Grotius’ rule was forgotten by those who drafted the modern European Codes
(Parisi and Fon, 2005).
During Calabresi’s keynote speech, I was sitting at the dinner table with
other colleagues, including my former teacher and advisor Robert Cooter. I
asked him, why is it so that in modern tort law nobody considered Calabresi’s
(and Grotius’) rule. His response was simple and seemingly persuasive: it is not
possible to create incentives and to do loss-spreading at the same time. What
Calabresi and Grotius proposed de facto provided a form of partial mutual
insurance between tortfeasor and victim in the event of a non-negligent accident. According to the conventional wisdom, that form of mutual insurance, of
loss-spreading, would dilute the incentives to take full precautions for the
parties involved. A diligent tortfeasor would only be partially rewarded for
taking optimal precautions, since he would remain partially liable for the loss
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even when acting diligently (loss-sharing). Likewise, a diligent victim would still
bear part of the residual loss, notwithstanding his due care. Once again, the
general reaction that Calabresi’s keynote presentation provoked, as I perceived
it, was that there are better ways to spread risks and bring fairness in the
allocation of accident losses – no need to do so by undermining incentives.
Kaplow and Shavell’s two-step optimization was at the core of this general
response, where we, as law and economics scholars, focus on the first step of
efficiency, and leave the second, often unspoken, step of fairness, for somebody
else to implement.
The conference was over, but there were two questions that I took home
with me. First, Calabresi’s earlier warning was still echoing – optimizing in two
steps is ok, but by excluding fairness from the formulation of the social objective, we are not optimizing what humans ultimately desire. Spreading the loss
between non-negligent parties seemed fairer and more consistent with what
most humans would actually prefer, compared to the all-or-nothing allocations
of the loss that are generated by strict liability and negligence rules. Yet, the
social objective functions that we use when modeling tort law are not capable of
showing the advantages of Calabresi’s rule. Second, it was not obvious to me
that implementing loss-sharing between non-negligent parties would actually
undermine their incentives to invest in precautions. After all, tortfeasors have
optimal incentives to invest in precaution when they are threatened with full
liability (e. g. under a strict liability rule) for non-negligent accidents. Why
would they have diluted incentives to take precautions under a loss-sharing
rule, under which they would face partial liability for non-negligent accidents?
And the same argument could be formulated for the prospective victim. Victims
face full incentives to take precautions even when taking precautions does not
entitle them to compensation (e. g. under a negligence rule). Why would they
not have incentives to take precautions under a rule that rewards their diligence
with partial compensation (loss-sharing)?

2.3 The follow-up research and its protagonists
This was the beginning of my research on loss-sharing for non-negligent losses.
Proving my intuition, that spreading non-negligent losses would not undermine
care incentives for either party, proved to be more difficult than I anticipated.
Notwithstanding my initial intuition, I could not come up with anything close to
a general proof. I needed to find some smart coauthors. So, I contacted two
people I considered ideal for the task, one for his creativity and intelligence, and
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the other for her distinguished mathematical background. The two people I
contacted were Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, still a graduate student at Utrecht
University, and Vincy Fon, a professor of mathematical economics at George
Washington University.
We began writing a paper titled “Comparative Causation.” It was a 3-author
team. The team worked together until version 162 of the paper. At that point,
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci dropped out of the team. He would probably still be a
graduate student at Utrecht if he had continued to spend time working with us.
Version 534 of the paper was eventually published in the American Law and
Economics Review in 2004 (Parisi and Fon, 2004).
The ideas born during Guido Calabresi’s dinner speech led to a very prolific
collaboration with Vincy Fon (with whom I subsequently wrote a few dozen
papers and a book) and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (with whom I have written and
continue to write the best papers of my career). I am so glad that version 534 of
the Comparative Causation paper was accepted for publication, even if that final
iteration of the paper, still did not have a general proof of what we wanted to
show. The Maryland Law Review later organized a symposium to discuss
Calabresi’s idea, and on that occasion, I highlighted the historical antecedent
of Calabresi’s idea and Grotius’ earlier writings on loss-spreading between nonnegligent parties (Parisi and Fon, 2005). Here, I should mention another accidental encounter. I remember presenting the Comparative Causation paper at a
conference in India, at the Delhi School of Economics. There, I explained the
results of the paper were not as strong as we would have liked, since we did not
have a general proof. Six years later, I received an email from an Indian
professor, Ram Singh. He told me that he was a PhD student at the Delhi
School of Economics and that, after attending my presentation on Comparative
Causation, he had been working to find a general proof of our results. He sent
me his work, and we published a follow-up paper proving that it is always
possible to spread the accident loss between non-negligent parties without
undermining their incentives to undertake optimal precautions (Parisi and
Singh, 2010).
Loss-spreading is thus fully compatible with optimal care incentives and
deterrence in tort law. The question then became, when is it desirable to spread
the accident loss, rather than adopting the all-or-nothing solutions of conventional tort rules? This question was addressed in Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014), and
more extensively in a paper published in the Journal of Legal Studies with my
former student, and now colleague, Alice Guerra and with my Bologna colleague, Emanuela Carbonara (Carbonara et al., 2016). In that paper, we recast
the cheapest cost avoider principle in light of the possibility of spreading
accident losses between non-negligent parties.
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2.4 Remaining young
Most of my research during the last several years involved some of my former
students and current students as co-authors. In my research, looking back, the
average age of the co-authorship team stayed about constant. Soon, I’ll need to
recruit my coauthors in elementary school, or get a larger team of co-authors to
keep the average down.
These collaborations have in many ways helped me stay young in my research.
After stumbling into the first law and economics class at Berkeley, the Tort Theory
and Policy seminar, I remember being under the impression that the field of tort law
and economics had been exhaustively studied. Two comprehensive books had been
published, almost simultaneously, by Harvard University Press: Landes and
Posner’s, Economics of Tort Law (Harvard, 1987) and Shavell’s, Economics of
Accident Law (Harvard, 1987). Papers in the field of tort law and economics were
becoming increasingly complex and were analyzing narrow and less appealing
legal issues. The same seemed true in other standard fields of law, such as
contracts. The search for low-hanging fruits, in my mind, was to move towards
other fields. As a result, in my early research, I ventured into less explored fields,
such as conflict of laws,5 international law and European Union law,6 social norms
and decentralized law,7 reciprocity,8 tax law,9 Biblical law,10 public choice and
collective decision-making,11 lawmaking,12 jury design,13 litigation,14 comparative
law and economics,15 irrational behavior,16 terrorism and cybersecurity,17 etc.

5 Parisi and O’Hara (1998); Parisi and Ribstein (1998); Ghei and Parisi (2004); Carbonara and
Parisi (2009).
6 Bertolini and Parisi (1996); Bussani et al. (2003); Parisi (2004b); Parisi et al. (2007); Stephan et al.
(2003); Carbonara et al. (2009); Fon and Parisi (2007a, 2008b, 2009b); Kontorovich and Parisi (2016).
7 Klick and Parisi (2008); Parisi (1998b); Carbonara et al. (2008a, 2012); Bernstein and Parisi
(2014).
8 Fon and Parisi (2003b, 2008a, 2008c).
9 Klick and Parisi (2005a); Curry et al. (2007).
10 Parisi (2001); Parisi and Dari-Mattiacci (2004).
11 Parisi (2002a); Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005, 2014); Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2007); Dari-Mattiacci
et al. (2009); Parisi (1998a); Klick and Parisi (2003); Parisi (2003); Luppi and Parisi (2012a).
12 Parisi and Ghei (2005); Carbonara and Parisi (2007); Fon and Parisi (2007b); Carbonara et al.
(2008b); Luppi and Parisi (2009); Parisi and Fon (2009); Cooter and Parisi (2009a); Parisi (2011).
13 Luppi and Parisi (2013).
14 Luppi and Parisi (2010); Fon and Parisi (2006); Fon and Parisi (2003a, 2005); Luppi and
Parisi (2012b).
15 Luppi et al. (2012); Ginsburg et al. (2014).
16 Parisi and Smith (2005).
17 Garoupa et al. (2006); Grady and Parisi (2006).
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My graduate students, with their questions, term papers, and dissertations,
brought me back into the beautiful core fields of law and economics, such as the
Coase theorem,18 contracts,19 torts,20 property,21 evidence,22 competition law,23
and general methodology.24 These students offered fresh perspectives, and
opened new research horizons into topics I thought had been fully studied.
There were entire unexplored rooms, possibly bigger and more fascinating than
those that had been explored by the existing literature. Here are a few examples.
One day, my University of Minnesota J.D. student, later EDLE Ph.D. student, and
now professor, Daniel Pi, asked in class: “Professor, what do you mean by
tortfeasor’s precautions and victim’s precautions? When we take precautions,
we are just being ‘careful’ to avoid accidents, we do not know what role we will
have – tortfeasors or victims – in the event of an accident.” Indeed, in so many
situations, we take precautions under the veil of uncertainty, and some precautions play a dual role, reducing the risk of accidents in general. Do existing
liability rules incentivize those dual-function precautions? Wow, what a fundamental question he asked! It definitely deserved a paper, which we indeed
ended up writing (Luppi et al., 2016). The paper showed that not all liability
rules incentivize the adoption of dual-function precautions. Another recent
example. My Bologna student, and now colleague, Alice Guerra asked:
“Professor, are we sure that tortfeasors and victims react to liability rules symmetrically as predicted by the model?” Indeed, if that basic assumption does not
hold, most of the predictions built on tort theory would fall apart. In a recent
experiment, we tested that symmetry assumption and discovered that, although
on average the symmetry assumption generally holds, there are interesting
differences in the behavior of tortfeasors and victims (Guerra and Parisi, 2020).
Other work with Ariel Porat and two of my colleagues in Bologna, Maria
Bigoni and Stefania Bortolotti, brought me back to a core topic of private law,
efficient breach, to address one of Calabresi’s fundamental questions (Bigoni
et al., 2017). Posner, both as a scholar and as a judge, argued that efficient
breach (of contract) is efficient breach, and according to US common law, the
motive for the breach should be deemed irrelevant. Whether the breachor
breaches to pursue a gain or to avoid a loss, as long as he is willing to
18 Luppi and Parisi (2011); Posner and Parisi (2013).
19 Parisi et al. (2011); Parisi et al. (2013); Bigoni et al. (2017).
20 Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2003); Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2014); Luppi et al. (2016).
21 Parisi (2002b).
22 Guerra et al. (2018).
23 Guerra et al. (2019).
24 Posner and Parisi (1997, 2002); Parisi (2004a); Klick and Parisi (2005b); Parisi and Rowley
(2005); Cooter and Parisi (2009b, 2009c); Parisi (2017).
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compensate the breachee for the forgone profit, he should be allowed to breach.
But are human reactions aligned with what the law prescribes? It turns out they
do not at all.
Browsing through some of the panels at the 2019 EALE conference, I had a
good feeling of freshness. Presenters and organizers are no longer looking for
narrower, unaddressed topics, nor are we trying to find low-hanging fruits in
unexplored areas of law. Unlike what we saw in past years, the panels had titles
such as Torts, Contracts, Criminal Law, etc. We were not trying to be innovative
by carving new niches or naming esoteric fields. The papers I heard were
fascinating and novel for bringing new methodological challenges into the
core, essential questions of the law.
My own research over the last few years revived the questions that Calabresi
raised when I first met him in the early 1990s. My students and younger
colleagues are bringing experimental evidence and data that makes the discussion fresh and intellectually compelling. Should the law conform to human
preferences, rather than to the economic social welfare function that we have
been using in our discipline, which omits important components of human
preferences in the objective social function? We are not going to answer this
question here, no worries. But we should hopefully leave with an open question.

2.5 Becoming a “prolific” scholar
I should conclude with a brief note of gratitude for the person who has been the
most important encounter in my career, my partner and co-author Barbara
Luppi. After she gave birth to my fifth and sixth children, my beautiful daughters Paola and Francesca, I officially accepted the title of “prolific” scholar. What
a wonderful woman and brilliant scholar Barbara is. My four older children,
Maria Chiara, Raffaele, Elvira Caterina and Anna, and their loving mom,
Carmela, have supported me during my years of study and work, following me
from California to Louisiana, and from Virginia to Minnesota. I have been
blessed by their love.
So much gratitude also goes to the many friends and scholars who contributed to my scholarship, most importantly to those young rising stars and
doctoral students, who, over the years, invited me to serve on their dissertation
committees, or enrolled in my classes, allowing me to grow younger in my
scholarship: Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Ben Depoorter, Daniel Pi, Alice Guerra,
Jonathan Klick, Matteo Rizzolli, Enrico Baffi, Marco Fabbri, Nita Ghei, Frank
Fagan, Gregory LaBlanc, Laarni Escresa, Joyce Sadka, and so many others.
Thanks to them, year after year, this intellectual tradition and friendship
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continues, with the smile and human connection that each of them, studentsturned-colleagues, deans, or presidents of associations, are granting to me, in
deeper and truer ways.

3 Conclusion
My academic life has progressed through a series of fortunate accidents. This is
not an exercise of false modesty, but I ultimately think that this award was also
given to me by mistake. During these months, I could think of many colleagues,
some of which I see sitting here today, others absent for more pressing academic
or administrative duties, who deserved this award more than me. But as for all the
fortunate accidents that brought me to where I am today, I am very grateful for
this award. Although most of my early academic career took place in the US, as
you heard from my story, all of you, European friends have played an enormous
role in the evolution of my career and scholarship. You made my academic life
interesting and truly fun. Hence, it is a great honor to receive this award from the
European Association of Law and Economics. I am grateful and humbled.

Link to video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lRwBq8EW-Tg
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